Vehicle --> METR Discrepancy Handling System:
METR discrepancy report

Definitions

METR discrepancy report (Information Flow): The "METR discrepancy report" information flow enables a METR User Device to alert the METR Discrepancy Handing Center of detected discrepancies (e.g., a conflict among METR rules, a conflict between an METR rule and a physical TCD) by issuing a report (e.g., images, OCR data) that identifies the apparent discrepancy in transport-related rules. The discrepancy will indicate the rule identifier(s), type of discrepancy, and supporting evidence to assist in a further, independent investigation. The discrepancy might be between electronic rules or between electronic and physical rules.

Vehicle (Source Physical Object): This 'Vehicle' physical object is used to model core capabilities that are common to more than one type of Vehicle. It provides the vehicle-based general sensory, processing, storage, and communications functions that support efficient, safe, and convenient travel. Many of these capabilities (e.g., see the Vehicle Safety service packages) apply to all vehicle types including personal vehicles, commercial vehicles, emergency vehicles, transit vehicles, and maintenance vehicles. From this perspective, the Vehicle includes the common interfaces and functions that apply to all motorized vehicles. The radio(s) supporting V2V and V2I communications are a key component of the Vehicle. Both one-way and two-way communications options support a spectrum of information services from basic broadcast to advanced personalized information services. Advanced sensors, processors, enhanced driver interfaces, and actuators complement the driver information services so that, in addition to making informed mode and route selections, the driver travels these routes in a safer and more consistent manner. This physical object supports all six levels of driving automation as defined in SAE J3016. Initial collision avoidance functions provide 'vigilant co-pilot' driver warning capabilities. More advanced functions assume limited control of the vehicle to maintain lane position and safe headways. In the most advanced implementations, this Physical Object supports full automation of all aspects of the driving task, aided by communications with other vehicles in the vicinity and in coordination with supporting infrastructure subsystems.

METR Discrepancy Handling System (Destination Physical Object): The 'METR Discrepancy Handling System' receives reports of discrepancies in rules from METR User Systems. It will perform a numerical analysis of discrepancy count vs. time for any given rule, and when warranted, report to the METR Regulation Center those rules with sufficient discrepancy reports to justify further investigation. It is identified as a separate center to provide a level of anonymity for the user that reports the issue. The METR Discrepancy Handling Center may register its availability as a service, and its associated cyber location information, with the Object Registration and Discovery System (ORDS).

Included In

This Triple is in the following Service Packages:

This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:

This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:

This Triple has the following triple relationships:

Communication Solutions

Solutions are sorted in ascending Gap Severity order. The Gap Severity is the parenthetical number at the end of the solution.

Selected Solution

(None-Data) - Secure Wireless Internet (EU)

Solution Description

This solution is used within Australia and the E.U.. It combines standards associated with (None-Data) with those for I-M: Secure Wireless Internet (EU). The (None-Data) standards include an unspecified set of standards at the upper layers. The I-M: Secure Wireless Internet (EU) standards include lower-layer standards that support secure communications between two entities, either or both of which may be mobile devices, but they must be stationary or only moving within wireless range of a single wireless access point (e.g., a parked car). Security is based on X.509 certificates. A non-mobile (if any) endpoint may connect to the service provider using any Internet connection method.

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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.

Characteristics

Characteristic Value
Time Context Recent
Spatial Context Regional
Acknowledgement True
Cardinality Unicast
Initiator Source
Authenticable True
Encrypt True


Interoperability Description
National This triple should be implemented consistently within the geopolitical region through which movement is essentially free (e.g., the United States, the European Union).

Security

Information Flow Security
  Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Rating Moderate Moderate Low
Basis Will include some artifact indicating the identity of the reporter; while this could be a pseudonym, it could eventually be associated with the reporter. There is no good reason for discrepancy reporters to be observed by anyone outside the METR system. Information contained in this flow will be used to assess the accuracy of existing rules; this will require some process that strips out incorrect reports, but the number of incorrect reports should be minimized to reduce undue processing. There should be many opportunities to provide discrepancy reports, so there is no pressing need for a requirement above LOW.


Security Characteristics Value
Authenticable True
Encrypt True