Traffic Management Center --> ITS Roadway Equipment:
variable speed limit control
Definitions
variable speed limit control (Information Flow): Information used to configure and control variable speed limit systems including the equipment used to provide current speed limits and other information to drivers.
Traffic Management Center (Source Physical Object): The 'Traffic Management Center' monitors and controls traffic and the road network. It represents centers that manage a broad range of transportation facilities including freeway systems, rural and suburban highway systems, and urban and suburban traffic control systems. It communicates with ITS Roadway Equipment and Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment (RSE) to monitor and manage traffic flow and monitor the condition of the roadway, surrounding environmental conditions, and field equipment status. It manages traffic and transportation resources to support allied agencies in responding to, and recovering from, incidents ranging from minor traffic incidents through major disasters.
ITS Roadway Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
Relationship | Source | Destination | Flow |
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Interactive | ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | variable speed limit status |
Communication Solutions
- AU: DMS and RWIS data - DMS and RWIS Comms (0)
- EU: UTMC Data - UTMC (4)
- US: NTCIP Message Sign - SNMPv3/TLS (5)
- US: NTCIP Message Sign - SNMPv1/TLS (6)
- US: NTCIP Message Sign - SNMPv1 (32)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
SA TS 5719 |
Click gap icons for more info.
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Mgmt
SA TS 5719 |
Facilities
SA TS 5719 |
Security
SA TS 5719 |
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TransNet
SA TS 5719 |
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Access
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
---|---|
Time Context | Recent |
Spatial Context | Local |
Acknowledgement | True |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Source |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | True |
Interoperability | Description |
---|---|
Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | Moderate | High | Moderate | |
Basis | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all.. DISC: WYO believes this to be LOW or MODERATE depending on the application. NYC believes it to be LOW, as this information is directly observable. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. From NYC: The information sent from TMC directly affect the ITS-RE speed "announcement". | NYC: The ITS-RE can work accordingly or in fail-safe if information is not available. WYO believes this to be MODERATE. Given the impacts for WYO scnearios, defaulted to MODERATE. |
Security Characteristics | Value |
---|---|
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | True |