Authorizing Center --> Other Authorizing Centers:
permission request coordination
This triple is bi-directional. See also
Other Authorizing Centers --> Authorizing Center: permission request coordination
Definitions
permission request coordination (Information Flow): Coordination of permission requests between jurisdictions or regions that allow permissions to be managed that may span more than one jurisdiction.
Authorizing Center (Source Physical Object): The 'Authorizing Center' provides the functionality needed to enable data exchange between and among mobile and fixed transportation users. Its primary mission is to enable safety, mobility and environmental communications-based applications for both mobile and non-mobile users. The Authorizing Center has some jurisdiction over limited access resources; typically this includes roadside application access and radio spectrum licensing. It may be implemented as an autonomous center or as a set of supporting services that are co-located within another center.
Other Authorizing Centers (Destination Physical Object): 'Other Authorizing Centers' provides a source and destination for information flows between multiple authorizing centers that manage permissions for the Connected Vehicle Environment. The interface represented by this object enables coordination of permissions between centers in different regions, jurisdictions, or application areas.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
Relationship | Source | Destination | Flow |
---|---|---|---|
Interactive | Other Authorizing Centers | Authorizing Center | permission request coordination |
Communication Solutions
- (None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (32)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
Development needed |
Click gap icons for more info.
|
||
Mgmt
|
Facilities
Development needed |
Security
|
|
TransNet
|
|||
Access
Internet Subnet Alternatives |
Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
---|---|
Time Context | Static |
Spatial Context | Regional |
Acknowledgement | True |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Source |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | True |
Interoperability | Description |
---|---|
Regional | Interoperability throughout the geopolitical region is highly desirable, but if implemented differently in different transportation management jurisdictions, significant benefits will still accrue in each jurisdiction. Regardless, this Information Flow Triple should be implemented consistently within a transportation jurisdiction (i.e., the scope of a regional architecture). |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | High | High | Moderate | |
Basis | End entity identity and associated permissions could be contained. This PII could include that of emergency personnel, and could include permissions assigned, all of which, if easily accessed could have a high cost of recover. Flow is not realized by known standards, so it may be possible to lower it to MODERATE in the future, when it can be better characterized. | Assignment of permissions with control over physical communications channels needs the greatest possible protection and cannot be mishandled or manipulated in transit. | While update of this flow may be important, it is a non-real-time service in most cases. Could possibly be LOW. |
Security Characteristics | Value |
---|---|
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | True |