ITS Roadway Equipment --> Multimodal Crossing Equipment:
highway control status
Definitions
highway control status (Information Flow): Current traffic control equipment status that indicates operational status and right-of-way availability to the non-highway transportation mode at a multimodal crossing.
ITS Roadway Equipment (Source Physical Object): 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included.
Multimodal Crossing Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'Multimodal Crossing Equipment' represents the control equipment that interfaces to a non-road based transportation system at an interference crossing with the roadway. The majority of these crossings are railroad grade crossings that are more specifically addressed by the "Wayside Equipment" terminator. This multimodal crossing terminator addresses similar interface requirements, but for other specialized intersections like draw bridges at rivers and canals. These crossings carry traffic that may take priority over the road traffic at the intersection. The data provided will in its basic form be a simple "stop road traffic" indication. However more complex data flows may be provided that give the time at which right-of-way will be required and the duration of that right-of-way requirement.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
- tmmc-crossing_clear_at_highways
- tmmc-crossing_clear_at_roads
- tmmc-highway_equipment_status
- tmmc-road_equipment_status
- tmmc-stop_alternate_mode_at_highways
- tmmc-stop_alternate_mode_at_roads
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
None |
Communication Solutions
- (None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (32)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
Development needed |
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Mgmt
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Facilities
Development needed |
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TransNet
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Access
Internet Subnet Alternatives |
Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
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Time Context | Recent |
Spatial Context | Adjacent |
Acknowledgement | False |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Destination |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | True |
Interoperability | Description |
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Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
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Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | Moderate | High | Moderate | |
Basis | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. |
Security Characteristics | Value |
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Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | True |