Center --> Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment:
RSE application install/upgrade
Definitions
RSE application install/upgrade (Information Flow): This flow supports remote installation and update of software applications residing in the RSE. It supports transmission of the secure software installation files, including executable application code and associated support files.
Center (Source Physical Object): This general physical object is used to model core capabilities that are common to any center.
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment' (CV RSE) represents the Connected Vehicle roadside devices that are used to send messages to, and receive messages from, nearby vehicles using Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) or other alternative wireless communications technologies. Communications with adjacent field equipment and back office centers that monitor and control the RSE are also supported. This device operates from a fixed position and may be permanently deployed or a portable device that is located temporarily in the vicinity of a traffic incident, road construction, or a special event. It includes a processor, data storage, and communications capabilities that support secure communications with passing vehicles, other field equipment, and centers.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
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Communication Solutions
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TUF - Secure Internet (ITS) (4)
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US: NTCIP Roadside Unit - SNMPv3/TLS (23)
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(None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (32)
Selected Solution
TUF - Secure Internet (ITS)Solution Description
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ITS Application Entity
No Standard Needed  |
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
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TransNet
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Access
Internet Subnet Alternatives |
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
| Characteristic | Value |
|---|---|
| Time Context | Recent |
| Spatial Context | Local |
| Acknowledgement | True |
| Cardinality | Unicast |
| Initiator | Source |
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | True |
| Interoperability | Description |
|---|---|
| Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
| Information Flow Security | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
| Rating | High | High | Moderate | |
| Basis | RSE control, configuration and software/firmware update should all be protected from view. A hostile third party could use this information to reverse engineer control/configuration/update processes, and use that information in an attack across a broad swatch of infrastructure, which would have severe effects to the connected vehicle infrastructure. | RSE control, configuration and update need to be correct or the RSE may be misconfigured, which for some applications could have severe safety impacts. | RSE control, configuration and update needs to be available; however the availability requirement is probably less than Integrity, as without this flow the RSE can continue to operate. The exception would be post-cyber attack, when this flow becomes critical. In a high threat environment, may raise this to HIGH. | |
| Security Characteristics | Value |
|---|---|
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | True |