TM16: Reversible Lane Management
This service package provides for the management of reversible lane facilities. In addition to standard surveillance capabilities, this service package includes sensory functions that detect wrong-way vehicles and other special surveillance capabilities that mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. The package includes the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. This service package also includes the equipment used to electronically reconfigure intersections and manage right-of-way to address dynamic demand changes and special events.
Relevant Regions: Australia, Canada, European Union, and United States
- Enterprise
- Functional
- Physical
- Goals and Objectives
- Needs and Requirements
- Sources
- Security
- Standards
- System Requirements
Enterprise
Development Stage Roles and Relationships
Installation Stage Roles and Relationships
Operations and Maintenance Stage Roles and Relationships
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Source | Destination | Role/Relationship |
---|---|---|
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Maintainer | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment | Maintains |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Manager | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment | Manages |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Maintainer | System Maintenance Agreement |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Manager | Operations Agreement |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Driver | Application Usage Agreement |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Vehicle Maintainer | Maintenance Data Exchange Agreement |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Vehicle Owner | Information Exchange and Action Agreement |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Vehicle User | Service Usage Agreement |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Supplier | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Warranty |
Driver | Vehicle | Operates |
ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | ITS Roadway Equipment | Maintains |
ITS Roadway Equipment Manager | ITS Roadway Equipment | Manages |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Maintainer | Maintenance Data Exchange Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment Owner | Information Exchange and Action Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment User | Service Usage Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | System Maintenance Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment Manager | Operations Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Other ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | Maintenance Data Exchange Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Information Exchange and Action Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Other ITS Roadway Equipment User | Service Usage Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Traffic Management Center Maintainer | Maintenance Data Exchange Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Traffic Management Center Owner | Information Exchange and Action Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Traffic Management Center User | Service Usage Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Traffic Operations Personnel | Application Usage Agreement |
ITS Roadway Equipment Supplier | ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Warranty |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | Maintains |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Manager | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | Manages |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | Maintenance Data Exchange Agreement |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Information Exchange and Action Agreement |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment User | Service Usage Agreement |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Other ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | System Maintenance Agreement |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Other ITS Roadway Equipment Manager | Operations Agreement |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment Supplier | Other ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Warranty |
Traffic Management Center Maintainer | Traffic Management Center | Maintains |
Traffic Management Center Manager | Traffic Management Center | Manages |
Traffic Management Center Manager | Traffic Operations Personnel | System Usage Agreement |
Traffic Management Center Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment Maintainer | Maintenance Data Exchange Agreement |
Traffic Management Center Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment Owner | Information Provision Agreement |
Traffic Management Center Owner | ITS Roadway Equipment User | Service Usage Agreement |
Traffic Management Center Owner | Traffic Management Center Maintainer | System Maintenance Agreement |
Traffic Management Center Owner | Traffic Management Center Manager | Operations Agreement |
Traffic Management Center Supplier | Traffic Management Center Owner | Warranty |
Traffic Operations Personnel | Traffic Management Center | Operates |
Vehicle Characteristics Maintainer | Vehicle Characteristics | Maintains |
Vehicle Characteristics Manager | Vehicle Characteristics | Manages |
Vehicle Characteristics Owner | Vehicle Characteristics Maintainer | System Maintenance Agreement |
Vehicle Characteristics Owner | Vehicle Characteristics Manager | Operations Agreement |
Vehicle Characteristics Supplier | Vehicle Characteristics Owner | Warranty |
Vehicle Maintainer | Vehicle | Maintains |
Vehicle Manager | Driver | System Usage Agreement |
Vehicle Manager | Vehicle | Manages |
Vehicle Owner | Vehicle Maintainer | System Maintenance Agreement |
Vehicle Owner | Vehicle Manager | Operations Agreement |
Vehicle Supplier | Vehicle Owner | Warranty |
Functional
This service package includes the following Functional View PSpecs:
Physical
The physical diagram can be viewed in SVG or PNG format and the current format is SVG.SVG Diagram
PNG Diagram
Includes Physical Objects:
Physical Object | Class | Description |
---|---|---|
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment | Field | 'Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment' (CV RSE) represents the Connected Vehicle roadside devices that are used to send messages to, and receive messages from, nearby vehicles using Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) or other alternative wireless communications technologies. Communications with adjacent field equipment and back office centers that monitor and control the RSE are also supported. This device operates from a fixed position and may be permanently deployed or a portable device that is located temporarily in the vicinity of a traffic incident, road construction, or a special event. It includes a processor, data storage, and communications capabilities that support secure communications with passing vehicles, other field equipment, and centers. |
Driver | Vehicle | The 'Driver' represents the person that operates a vehicle on the roadway. Included are operators of private, transit, commercial, and emergency vehicles where the interactions are not particular to the type of vehicle (e.g., interactions supporting vehicle safety applications). The Driver originates driver requests and receives driver information that reflects the interactions which might be useful to all drivers, regardless of vehicle classification. Information and interactions which are unique to drivers of a specific vehicle type (e.g., fleet interactions with transit, commercial, or emergency vehicle drivers) are covered by separate objects. |
ITS Roadway Equipment | Field | 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included. |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | Field | Representing another set of ITS Roadway Equipment, 'Other ITS Roadway Equipment' supports 'field device' to 'field device' communication and coordination, and provides a source and destination for information that may be exchanged between ITS Roadway Equipment. The interface enables direct coordination between field equipment. Examples include the direct interface between sensors and other roadway devices (e.g., Dynamic Message Signs) and the direct interface between roadway devices (e.g., between a Signal System Master and Signal System Local equipment) or a connection between an arterial signal system master and a ramp meter controller. |
Traffic Management Center | Center | The 'Traffic Management Center' monitors and controls traffic and the road network. It represents centers that manage a broad range of transportation facilities including freeway systems, rural and suburban highway systems, and urban and suburban traffic control systems. It communicates with ITS Roadway Equipment and Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment (RSE) to monitor and manage traffic flow and monitor the condition of the roadway, surrounding environmental conditions, and field equipment status. It manages traffic and transportation resources to support allied agencies in responding to, and recovering from, incidents ranging from minor traffic incidents through major disasters. |
Traffic Operations Personnel | Center | 'Traffic Operations Personnel' represents the people that operate a traffic management center. These personnel interact with traffic control systems, traffic surveillance systems, incident management systems, work zone management systems, and travel demand management systems. They provide operator data and command inputs to direct system operations to varying degrees depending on the type of system and the deployment scenario. |
Vehicle | Vehicle | This 'Vehicle' physical object is used to model core capabilities that are common to more than one type of Vehicle. It provides the vehicle-based general sensory, processing, storage, and communications functions that support efficient, safe, and convenient travel. Many of these capabilities (e.g., see the Vehicle Safety service packages) apply to all vehicle types including personal vehicles, commercial vehicles, emergency vehicles, transit vehicles, and maintenance vehicles. From this perspective, the Vehicle includes the common interfaces and functions that apply to all motorized vehicles. The radio(s) supporting V2V and V2I communications are a key component of the Vehicle. Both one-way and two-way communications options support a spectrum of information services from basic broadcast to advanced personalized information services. Advanced sensors, processors, enhanced driver interfaces, and actuators complement the driver information services so that, in addition to making informed mode and route selections, the driver travels these routes in a safer and more consistent manner. This physical object supports all six levels of driving automation as defined in SAE J3016. Initial collision avoidance functions provide 'vigilant co-pilot' driver warning capabilities. More advanced functions assume limited control of the vehicle to maintain lane position and safe headways. In the most advanced implementations, this Physical Object supports full automation of all aspects of the driving task, aided by communications with other vehicles in the vicinity and in coordination with supporting infrastructure subsystems. |
Vehicle Characteristics | Vehicle | 'Vehicle Characteristics' represents the external view of individual vehicles of any class from cars and light trucks up to large commercial vehicles and down to micromobility vehicles (MMVs). It includes vehicle physical characteristics such as height, width, length, weight, and other properties (e.g., magnetic properties, number of axles) of individual vehicles that can be sensed and measured or classified. This physical object represents the physical properties of vehicles that can be sensed by vehicle-based or infrastructure-based sensors to support vehicle automation and traffic sensor systems. The analog properties provided by this terminator represent the sensor inputs that are used to detect and assess vehicle(s) within the sensor's range to support safe AV operation and/or responsive and safe traffic management. |
Includes Functional Objects:
Functional Object | Description | Physical Object |
---|---|---|
Roadway Basic Surveillance | 'Roadway Basic Surveillance' monitors traffic conditions using fixed equipment such as loop detectors and CCTV cameras. | ITS Roadway Equipment |
Roadway Reversible Lanes | 'Roadway Reversible Lanes' includes field elements that monitor and control reversible lane facilities. It includes the traffic sensors, surveillance equipment, lane control signals, physical lane access controls, and other field elements that manage traffic on these facilities. It provides current reversible lane facility status information and accepts requests and control commands from the controlling center. | ITS Roadway Equipment |
RSE Traveler Information Communications | 'RSE Traveler Information Communications' includes field elements that distribute information to vehicles for in-vehicle display. The information may be provided by a center (e.g., variable information on traffic and road conditions in the vicinity of the field equipment) or it may be determined and output locally (e.g., static sign information and signal phase and timing information). This includes the interface to the center or field equipment that controls the information distribution and the short range communications equipment that provides information to passing vehicles. | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment |
TMC Basic Surveillance | 'TMC Basic Surveillance' remotely monitors and controls traffic sensor systems and surveillance (e.g., CCTV) equipment, and collects, processes and stores the collected traffic data. Current traffic information and other real-time transportation information is also collected from other centers. The collected information is provided to traffic operations personnel and made available to other centers. | Traffic Management Center |
TMC Reversible Lane Management | 'TMC Reversible Lane Management' remotely monitors and controls reversible lanes. It provides an interface to reversible lane field equipment (traffic sensors, surveillance equipment, lane control signals, physical lane access controls, etc.) and to traffic operations personnel to support central monitoring and control of these facilities. | Traffic Management Center |
Vehicle Traveler Information Reception | 'Vehicle Traveler Information Reception' receives advisories, vehicle signage data, and other driver information of use to all types of vehicles and drivers and presents this information to the driver using in-vehicle equipment. Information presented may include fixed sign information, traffic control device status (e.g., signal phase and timing data), advisory and detour information, warnings of adverse road and weather conditions, travel times, and other driver information. | Vehicle |
Includes Information Flows:
Information Flow | Description |
---|---|
driver information | Regulatory, warning, guidance, and other information provided to the driver to support safe and efficient vehicle operation. |
driver input | Driver input to the vehicle on-board equipment including configuration data, settings and preferences, interactive requests, and control commands. |
driver updates | Information provided to the driver including visual displays, audible information and warnings, and haptic feedback. The updates inform the driver about current conditions, potential hazards, and the current status of vehicle on-board equipment. |
lane management control | Information used to configure and control dynamic lane management systems. |
lane management coordination | The direct flow of information between field equipment. This includes information used to configure and control dynamic lane management systems and the status of managed lanes including current operational state, violations, and logged information. This also includes lane usage information including both traditional traffic flow measures and special information associated with managed lanes such as measured passenger occupancies. It also includes the operational status of the lane management equipment. |
lane management information | System status of managed lanes including current operational state, violations, and logged information. This includes lane usage information including both traditional traffic flow measures and special information associated with managed lanes such as measured passenger occupancies. It also includes the operational status of the lane management equipment. |
reversible lane control | Control of automated reversible lane configuration and driver information systems. |
reversible lane coordination | The direct flow of information between field equipment. This includes control of automated reversible lane configuration and driver information systems and current reversible lane status including the operational status and mode of the reversible lane control equipment. |
reversible lane status | Current reversible lane status including traffic sensor and surveillance data and the operational status and mode of the reversible lane control equipment. |
signal control commands | Control of traffic signal controllers or field masters including clock synchronization. |
signal control coordination | The direct flow of information between field equipment. This includes configuration and control of traffic signal controllers or field masters. Configuration data and operational status of traffic signal control equipment including operating condition and current indications are returned. |
signal control device configuration | Data used to configure traffic signal control equipment including local controllers and system masters. |
signal control plans | Traffic signal timing parameters including minimum green time and interval durations for basic operation and cycle length, splits, offset, phase sequence, etc. for coordinated systems. |
signal control status | Operational and status data of traffic signal control equipment including operating condition and current indications. |
signal fault data | Faults reported by traffic signal control equipment. |
signal system configuration | Data used to configure traffic signal systems including configuring control sections and mode of operation (time based or traffic responsive). |
traffic detector control | Information used to configure and control traffic detector systems such as inductive loop detectors and machine vision sensors. |
traffic detector coordination | The direct flow of information between field equipment. This includes information used to configure and control traffic detector systems such as inductive loop detectors and machine vision sensors Raw and/or processed traffic detector data is returned that allows derivation of traffic flow variables (e.g., speed, volume, and density measures) and associated information (e.g., congestion, potential incidents). This flow includes the traffic data and the operational status of the traffic detectors |
traffic detector data | Raw and/or processed traffic detector data which allows derivation of traffic flow variables (e.g., speed, volume, and density measures) and associated information (e.g., congestion, potential incidents). This flow includes the traffic data and the operational status of the traffic detectors |
traffic image meta data | Meta data that describes traffic images. Traffic images (video) are in another flow. |
traffic images | High fidelity, real-time traffic images suitable for surveillance monitoring by the operator or for use in machine vision applications. This flow includes the images. Meta data that describes the images is contained in another flow. |
traffic operator data | Presentation of traffic operations data to the operator including traffic conditions, current operating status of field equipment, maintenance activity status, incident status, video images, security alerts, emergency response plan updates and other information. This data keeps the operator appraised of current road network status, provides feedback to the operator as traffic control actions are implemented, provides transportation security inputs, and supports review of historical data and preparation for future traffic operations activities. |
traffic operator input | User input from traffic operations personnel including requests for information, configuration changes, commands to adjust current traffic control strategies (e.g., adjust signal timing plans, change DMS messages), and other traffic operations data entry. |
vehicle characteristics | The physical or visible characteristics of individual vehicles that can be used to detect, classify, and monitor vehicles and imaged to uniquely identify vehicles. |
vehicle signage data | In-vehicle signing data that augments regulatory, warning, and informational road signs and signals. The information provided would include static sign information (e.g., stop, curve warning, guide signs, service signs, and directional signs) and dynamic information (e.g., local traffic and road conditions, restrictions, vehicle requirements, work zones, detours, closures, advisories, and warnings). |
vehicle signage local data | Information provided by adjacent field equipment to support in-vehicle signing of dynamic information that is currently being displayed to passing drivers. This includes the dynamic information (e.g., local traffic and road conditions, work zone information, lane restrictions, detours, closures, advisories, parking availability, etc.) and control parameters that identify the desired timing, duration, and priority of the signage data. |
video surveillance control | Information used to configure and control video surveillance systems. |
video surveillance coordination | The direct flow of information between field equipment. This includes information used to configure and control video surveillance systems and the high fidelity, real-time traffic images and associated meta data that are returned. |
Goals and Objectives
Associated Planning Factors and Goals
Planning Factor | Goal |
---|---|
A. Support the economic vitality of the metropolitan area, especially by enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency; | Improve freight network |
D. Increase the accessibility and mobility of people and for freight; | Reduce congestion |
E. Protect and enhance the environment, promote energy conservation, improve the quality of life, and promote consistency between transportation improvements and State and local planned growth and economic development patterns; | Protect/Enhance the Environment |
G. Promote efficient system management and operation; | Improve efficiency |
I. Improve the resiliency and reliability of the transportation system and reduce or mitigate stormwater impacts of surface transportation; | Improve resiliency and reliability |
Associated Objective Categories
Associated Objectives and Performance Measures
Needs and Requirements
Need | Functional Object | Requirement | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
01 | Traffic Operations need to be able to manage reversible lane facilities in order to allow lanes to be signed for operation in different directions at different times of the day. | Roadway Reversible Lanes | 02 | The field element shall include automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on surface streets, under center control. |
TMC Reversible Lane Management | 07 | The center shall provide the capability for center personnel to control access and management of reversible lane facilities, including the direction of traffic flow changes during the day, especially between the peak hours and dedication of more lanes to the congestion direction during special events. | ||
02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. | Roadway Basic Surveillance | 01 | The field element shall collect, process, digitize, and send traffic sensor data (speed, volume, and occupancy) to the center for further analysis and storage, under center control. |
04 | The field element shall return sensor and CCTV system operational status to the controlling center. | |||
Roadway Reversible Lanes | 01 | The field element shall monitor traffic in reversible lanes, including wrong-way vehicles, using sensors and surveillance equipment under center control. | ||
TMC Basic Surveillance | 01 | The center shall monitor, analyze, and store traffic sensor data (speed, volume, occupancy) collected from field elements under remote control of the center. | ||
02 | The center shall monitor, analyze, and distribute traffic images from CCTV systems under remote control of the center. | |||
05 | The center shall respond to control data from center personnel regarding sensor and surveillance data collection, analysis, storage, and distribution. | |||
06 | The center shall maintain a database of surveillance equipment and sensors and associated data (including the roadway on which they are located, the type of data collected, and the ownership of each). | |||
07 | The center shall remotely control devices to detect traffic. | |||
TMC Reversible Lane Management | 02 | The center shall monitor the use of reversible lanes and detect wrong-way vehicles in reversible lanes using sensor and surveillance information, and the current lane control status (which direction the lane is currently operating). | ||
03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. | Roadway Reversible Lanes | 04 | The field element shall provide operational status for the reversible lane field equipment to the center. |
05 | The field element shall provide fault data for the reversible lane field equipment to the center. | |||
TMC Reversible Lane Management | 01 | The center shall remotely control devices to detect traffic in reversible lanes, including wrong-way vehicles. | ||
03 | The center shall remotely control automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on surface streets. | |||
04 | The center shall remotely control automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on freeways. | |||
05 | The center shall collect operational status for the reversible lane field equipment. | |||
06 | The center shall collect fault data for the reversible lane field equipment and send to the maintenance center for repair. | |||
04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. | Roadway Reversible Lanes | 03 | The field element shall include automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on freeways, under center control. |
RSE Traveler Information Communications | 01 | The field element shall distribute traveler information including traffic and road conditions or upcoming work zones to passing vehicles using short range communications, under center control. | ||
02 | The field element shall distribute advisory information, such as evacuation information, wide-area alerts, incident information, work zone intrusion information, recommended speed limit and other special information to passing vehicles using short range communications, under center control. | |||
03 | The field element shall distribute indicator and fixed sign information, including static sign information (e.g., stop, curve warning, guide signs, service signs, and directional signs) and dynamic information (e.g., current signal states and local conditions warnings identified by local environmental sensors) to equipment on-board vehicles under center control. | |||
04 | The field element shall return system operational status to the controlling center. | |||
Vehicle Traveler Information Reception | 01 | The vehicle shall receive traveler information including traffic and road conditions, incident information, maintenance and construction information, event information, transit information, parking information, and weather information. | ||
02 | The vehicle shall receive advisory information, such as evacuation information, proximity to a maintenance and construction vehicle, wide-area alerts, work zone intrusion information, variable speed limits, tunnel entrance restrictions, and other special information. | |||
03 | The vehicle shall receive indicator and fixed sign information including static sign information (e.g., stop, curve warning, guide signs, service signs, and directional signs) and dynamic information (e.g., current signal and traffic meter states and local conditions warnings identified by local environmental sensors). | |||
04 | The vehicle shall store a translation table for road sign and message templates used for in-vehicle display. | |||
05 | The vehicle shall present the received information to the driver in audible or visual forms without impairing the driver's ability to control the vehicle in a safe manner. | |||
06 | The vehicle shall present to the driver a visual display of static sign information or dynamic roadway conditions information | |||
07 | The vehicle shall be capable of providing to the driver an audible presentation of static sign information or dynamic roadway conditions information |
Security
In order to participate in this service package, each physical object should meet or exceed the following security levels.
Physical Object Security | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Physical Object | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | Security Class |
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Class 1 |
ITS Roadway Equipment | High | High | Moderate | Class 4 |
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | High | High | Moderate | Class 4 |
Traffic Management Center | Moderate | High | Moderate | Class 3 |
Vehicle | Low | Low | Moderate | Class 1 |
Vehicle Characteristics |
In order to participate in this service package, each information flow triple should meet or exceed the following security levels.
Information Flow Security | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Source | Destination | Information Flow | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
Basis | Basis | Basis | |||
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment | Vehicle | vehicle signage data | Low | Moderate | Moderate |
This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. It is meant to augment other signage data, and by definition is meant to be shared with everyone. | These signs are meant to augment other visual cues to the driver. They should be accurate, but any inaccuracies should be corrected for by other means. | These notifications are helpful to a driver, but if the driver does not receive this notification immediately, there should still be other visual cues. | |||
Driver | Vehicle | driver input | Moderate | High | High |
Data included in this flow may include origin and destination information, which should be protected from other's viewing as it may compromise the driver's privacy. | Commands from from the driver to the vehicle must be correct or the vehicle may behave in an unpredictable and possibly unsafe manner | Commands must always be able to be given or the driver has no control. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment | vehicle signage local data | Low | Moderate | Moderate |
This data is intentionally transmitted to everyone via a broadcast. It is meant to augment other signage data, and by definition is meant to be shared with everyone. | This information impacts the vehicle signage data sent to neighboring ASDs and should be trusted to avoid sending wrong information. DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH. | The system should know if these messages are not received. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Driver | driver information | Not Applicable | High | Moderate |
This data is sent to all drivers and is also directly observable, by design. | This is the primary signal trusted by the driver to decide whether to go through the intersection and what speed to go through the intersection at; if it's wrong, accidents could happen. | If the lights are out you have to get a policeman to direct traffic – expensive and inefficient and may cause a cascading effect due to lack of coordination with other intersections. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | lane management coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | reversible lane coordination | High | High | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | signal control coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | traffic detector coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Other ITS Roadway Equipment | video surveillance coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | lane management information | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
May contain PII, may contain source data describing device control and sensed status that if captured could be used in the commission of a crime or breaking of traffic laws or regulations. | Information related to violations must be correct so that incorrect accusations are not made. Information related to device status and control must be correct to avoid wasted maintenance efforts. | More or less important depending on the context. Could even be LOW if areas of minimal import, depending on local policies. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | reversible lane status | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
May contain surveillance data; if that data includes license plates or other imagery, observation by a third party should be discouraged at this point (public camera data may be republished under other flows, but as chosen by the operator). Without such personally-focused surveillance data, this may be LOW. | Since this reports the status of reversible controls, any corruption or modification could have a catastrophic impact (if the center though the lanes were open in the opposite direction and allowed head-on traffic into the lanes). However, any such reversing should be accompanied by verification, either by camera or direct visual inspection, justifying lowering this to MODERATE. | Reversible lane controls should always be accessible, however this status flow will be supported by another, generally visual confirmation. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | signal control status | Low | High | Moderate |
The current conditions of an ITS RE are completely observable, by design. | This influences the TMC response to a right-of-way request. It should be as accurate as the right-of-way request themselves. For some applications (ISIG) this need only be moderate. Per THEA: info needs to be accurate and should not be tampered to enable effective monitoring and control by the TMC. DISC: THEA believes this to be MODERATE: "info needs to be accurate and should not be tampered to enable effective monitoring and control by the TMC; should be as accurate as the right of way request". NYC:TMC doesn't play an active role in this application, i.e. even if the information contained in this flow were incorrect, it is unlikely to affect the outcome of this application one way or the other. On some applications NYC has this MODERATE though. RES: This value can obviously change a lot depending on the application context. | The TMC will need the current status of the ITS RE in order to make an educated decision. If it is unavailable, the system is unable to operate. However, a few missed messages will not have a catastrophic impact. From NYC: TMC doesn't play an active role in this application, i.e. even if it is unavailable, it is unlikely to affect the outcome of this application one way or the other. RES: This value can change a lot depending on the application context. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | signal fault data | Low | High | Moderate |
The current conditions of an ITS RE are completely observable, by design. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | traffic detector data | Low | Moderate | Moderate |
No impact if someone sees the data | Some minimal guarantee of data integrity is necessary for all C-ITS flows. THEA believes this to be LOW.only limited adverse effect if raw/processed traffic detector data is bad/compromised; DISC: WYO believes this to be HIGH | Only limited adverse effect of info is not timely/readily available, however without this information it will be difficult to perform traffic management activities, thus MODERATE. If not used for management, may be LOW. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | traffic image meta data | Low | Moderate | Moderate |
Traffic image data is generally intended for public consumption, and in any event is already video captured in the public arena, so this must be LOW. | While accuracy of this data is important for decision making purposes, applications should be able to cfunction without it. Thus MODERATE generally. | While accuracy of this data is important for decision making purposes, applications should be able to function without it. Thus MODERATE generally. | |||
ITS Roadway Equipment | Traffic Management Center | traffic images | Low | Moderate | Low |
Traffic image data is generally intended for public consumption, and in any event is already video captured in the public arena, so this must be LOW. | Generally transportation coordination information should be correct between source and destination, or inappropriate actions may be taken. | While useful, there is no signficant impact if this flow is not available. | |||
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | ITS Roadway Equipment | lane management coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | ITS Roadway Equipment | reversible lane coordination | High | High | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | ITS Roadway Equipment | signal control coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | ITS Roadway Equipment | traffic detector coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Other ITS Roadway Equipment | ITS Roadway Equipment | video surveillance coordination | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Any control flow has some confidentiality requirement, as observation of the flow may enable an attacker to analyze and learn how to assume control. MODERATE for most flows as the potential damage is likely contained, though anything that could have a significant safety impact may be assigned HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Since this directly impacts device control, we consider it the same as a control flow. Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | lane management control | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | reversible lane control | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | signal control commands | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: NYC believes this to be LOW: "The result of this will be directly observable." | Invalid messages could lead to an unauthorized user gaining control of an intersection. This could also be used to bring traffic to a standstill, which could lead to a large financial impact on the community. DISC: NYC believes this to be MODERATE: The signal timing is critical to the intersection operation; incorrect signal timing can lead to significant congestion and unreliable operation; while unsafe operation is controlled by the cabinet monitoring system, attackers could "freeze" the signal or call a preemption. RES: This will vary depending on the application and implementation. | These messages are important to help with preemption and signal priority applications. Without them, these applications mayl not work. However, if these signals are not received, the ITS RE will continue to function using its default configuration. The TMC should have an acknowledgement of the receipt of a message. DISC: NYC blieves this to be LOW: TMC doesn't play an active role in this application, i.e. even if it is unavailable, it is unlikely to affect the outcome of this application one way or the other. RES: This will vary depending on the application and implementation. |
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Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | signal control device configuration | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: THEA believes this to be LOW: "encrypted, authenticated, proprietary; however will not cause harm if seen, traffic light information is visible." | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. From THEA: proprietary info that should not be tampered with; includes local controllers and system masters; tampering with configurations could cause delays along with major safety issues | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. From THEA: should be timely and readily available; however, should be able to function using a default configuration | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | signal control plans | Moderate | High | Moderate |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: THEA believes this to be LOW: "encrypted, authenticated, proprietary; but the result is directly observable from traffic lights | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. From THEA: proprietary info that should not be tampered with; tampering with these plans could cause delays along with major safety issues | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. From THEA: should be timely and readily available; coordinated with other systems; however, should be able to function using a default configuration | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | signal system configuration | Low | High | Moderate |
encrypted, authenticated, proprietary; however, the result is directly observable from traffic lights | proprietary info that should not be tampered with; data used to configure traffic signal systems; could cause significant delays and traffic issues if compromised | should be readily available; configurations can be time | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | traffic detector control | Moderate | Moderate | Low |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: THEA, WYO believe this to be LOW: encrypted, authenticated, proprietary; but should not cause severe damage if seen | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH.. From THEA: should be accurate and not be tampered with; could enable outside control of traffic sensors but should not cause severe harm, but could cause issues with traffic sensor data received and be detrimental to operations | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH.. From THEA: want updates but delayed information will not be severe; should be able to operate from a previous/default control/config. DISC: WYO believes this to be MODERATE | |||
Traffic Management Center | ITS Roadway Equipment | video surveillance control | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |||
Traffic Management Center | Traffic Operations Personnel | traffic operator data | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
Backoffice operations flows should have minimal protection from casual viewing, as otherwise imposters could gain illicit control or information that should not be generally available. | Information presented to backoffice system operators must be consistent or the operator may perform actions that are not appropriate to the real situation. | The backoffice system operator should have access to system operation. If this interface is down then control is effectively lost, as without feedback from the system the operator has no way of knowing what is the correct action to take. | |||
Traffic Operations Personnel | Traffic Management Center | traffic operator input | Moderate | High | High |
Backoffice operations flows should have minimal protection from casual viewing, as otherwise imposters could gain illicit control or information that should not be generally available. | Backoffice operations flows should generally be correct and available as these are the primary interface between operators and system. | Backoffice operations flows should generally be correct and available as these are the primary interface between operators and system. | |||
Vehicle | Driver | driver updates | Not Applicable | Moderate | Moderate |
This data is informing the driver about the safety of a nearby area. It should not contain anything sensitive, and does not matter if another person can observe it. | This is the information that is presented to the driver. If they receive incorrect information, they may act in an unsafe manner. However, there are other indicators that would alert them to any hazards, such as an oncoming vehicle or crossing safety lights. | If this information is not made available to the driver, then the system has not operated correctly. |
Standards
The following table lists the standards associated with physical objects in this service package. For standards related to interfaces, see the specific information flow triple pages.
Name | Title | Physical Object |
---|---|---|
CTI 4001 RSU | Dedicated Short-Range Communications Roadside Unit Specifications (FHWA-JPO-17-589) | Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment |
ITE ATC | Advanced Transportation Controller | ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITE ATC API | Application Programming Interface Standard for the Advanced Transportation Controller | ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITE ATC ITS Cabinet | Intelligent Transportation System Standard Specification for Roadside Cabinets | ITS Roadway Equipment |
ITE ATC Model 2070 | Model 2070 Controller Standard | ITS Roadway Equipment |
NEMA TS 8 Cyber and Physical Security | Cyber and Physical Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems | ITS Roadway Equipment |
Traffic Management Center | ||
NEMA TS2 Traffic Controller Assemblies | Traffic Controller Assemblies with NTCIP Requirements | ITS Roadway Equipment |
System Requirements
System Requirement | Need | ||
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001 | The system shall monitor, analyze, and store traffic sensor data (speed, volume, occupancy) collected from field elements under remote control of the center. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
002 | The system shall monitor, analyze, and distribute traffic images from CCTV systems under remote control of the center. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
003 | The system shall respond to control data from center personnel regarding sensor and surveillance data collection, analysis, storage, and distribution. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
004 | The system shall maintain a database of surveillance equipment and sensors and associated data (including the roadway on which they are located, the type of data collected, and the ownership of each). | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
005 | The system shall remotely control devices to detect traffic. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
006 | The system shall remotely control devices to detect traffic in reversible lanes, including wrong-way vehicles. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
007 | The system shall monitor the use of reversible lanes and detect wrong-way vehicles in reversible lanes using sensor and surveillance information, and the current lane control status (which direction the lane is currently operating). | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
008 | The system shall remotely control automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on surface streets. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
009 | The system shall remotely control automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on freeways. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
010 | The system shall collect operational status for the reversible lane field equipment. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
011 | The system shall collect fault data for the reversible lane field equipment and send to the maintenance center for repair. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
012 | The system shall provide the capability for center personnel to control access and management of reversible lane facilities, including the direction of traffic flow changes during the day, especially between the peak hours and dedication of more lanes to | 01 | Traffic Operations need to be able to manage reversible lane facilities in order to allow lanes to be signed for operation in different directions at different times of the day. |
013 | The system shall collect, process, digitize, and send traffic sensor data (speed, volume, and occupancy) to the center for further analysis and storage, under center control. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
014 | The system shall return sensor and CCTV system operational status to the controlling center. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
015 | The system shall monitor traffic in reversible lanes, including wrong-way vehicles, using sensors and surveillance equipment under center control. | 02 | Traffic Operations need to be able to ensure safe operation of reversible lanes through wrong-way vehicle detection and other special surveillance capabilities in order to mitigate safety hazards associated with reversible lanes. |
016 | The system shall include automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on surface streets, under center control. | 01 | Traffic Operations need to be able to manage reversible lane facilities in order to allow lanes to be signed for operation in different directions at different times of the day. |
017 | The system shall include automated reversible lane equipment and driver information systems (such as lane control signals) that control traffic in reversible lanes on freeways, under center control. | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
018 | The system shall provide operational status for the reversible lane field equipment to the center. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
019 | The system shall provide fault data for the reversible lane field equipment to the center. | 03 | Traffic Operations need to be able to control the field equipment, physical lane access controls, and associated control electronics that manage and control these special lanes. |
020 | The system shall distribute traveler information including traffic and road conditions or upcoming work zones to passing vehicles using short range communications, under center control. | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
021 | The system shall distribute advisory information, such as evacuation information, wide-area alerts, incident information, work zone intrusion information, recommended speed limit and other special information to passing vehicles using short range communic | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
022 | The system shall distribute indicator and fixed sign information, including static sign information (e.g., stop, curve warning, guide signs, service signs, and directional signs) and dynamic information (e.g., current signal states and local conditions wa | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
023 | The system shall return system operational status to the controlling center. | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
024 | The system shall receive traveler information including traffic and road conditions, incident information, maintenance and construction information, event information, transit information, parking information, and weather information. | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
025 | The system shall receive advisory information, such as evacuation information, proximity to a maintenance and construction vehicle, wide-area alerts, work zone intrusion information, variable speed limits, tunnel entrance restrictions, and other special i | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
026 | The system shall receive indicator and fixed sign information including static sign information (e.g., stop, curve warning, guide signs, service signs, and directional signs) and dynamic information (e.g., current signal and traffic meter states and local | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
027 | The system shall store a translation table for road sign and message templates used for in-vehicle display. | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
028 | The system shall present the received information to the driver in audible or visual forms without impairing the driver's ability to control the vehicle in a safe manner. | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
029 | The system shall present to the driver a visual display of static sign information or dynamic roadway conditions information | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |
030 | The system shall provide to the driver an audible presentation of static sign information or dynamic roadway conditions information | 04 | Traffic Operations need to be able to provide current reversible lane status information to drivers. |